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Abstract
Debates about the underdetermination of theory by data often turn
on specific examples. Many cases are invoked often enough that they become familiar, even well-worn. Here I consider one such commonplace:
the connection between prenatal hormone levels and gender-linked childhood behavior. Since Helen Longino’s original discussion of this case a
decade-and-a-half ago, it has become become one of the stock examples of
underdetermination. However, the case is not genuinely underdetermined.
We can easily imagine a possible experiment to decide the question. The
fact that we would not perform this experiment is a moral, rather than
epistemic, point. Further, I argue that Longino need not have appealed
to ‘underdetermination’ to establish her central claim about the case.

1

Underdetermination

Arguments about the underdetermination of theory by data often depend on
examples. Philosophers list theory choices which are allegedly underdetermined
to show that underdetermination is serious and widespread. Consider, as illustration, a recent exchange between Ron Giere and Janet Kourany.
∗ This paper is based in part on work supported under a National Science Foundation
Graduate Fellowship, work which I presented at the University of Alabama, Birmingham in
Feb 2001 and in [Mag03, §4.3.3]. My thinking on these issues developed in response to feedback
from Philip Kitcher, Helen Longino, and some number of anonymous referees.
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Giere notes, “it is often argued that the underdetermination of theory by
data provides space for the social determination of theory” [Gie03, p. 19]. He
invokes some of the “many arguments that the extent of such underdetermination is not nearly so great as Kourany assumes” [Gie03, p. 19]. Giere cites
Laudan and Leplin [LL91], and in her reply Kourany cites Kukla [Kuk98]— yet
these are en passant references to general arguments by those other philosophers. Kourany suggests instead that the matter can be decided by examples.
“Abstract arguments aside,” she writes, “the scientific and philosophical literatures contain many examples of underdetermination in ‘real scientific practice’
” [Kou03, p. 23]. She goes on to mention a number of cases, including research
on the connection between IQ and race [Gly98] and between gender and hormones [Lon90]. Giere and Kourany share this concern for examples. She notes,
“Giere himself. . . has pointed to one of the applications in biology— Longino’s
critique of the linear-hormonal research program. . .. Longino illustrates the kind
of choice to which feminist principles lead” [Kou03, p. 24].
Of course, there is a prima facie gap between examples and general claims
about science. What justifies the inductive generalization from these cases?1
Nevertheless, as Earman writes, “the production of a few concrete examples is
enough to generate the worry that only a lack of imagination on our part prevents us from seeing comparable examples of underdetermination all over the
map” [Ear93, p. 31]. So it is important to consider examples directly, lest they
be uncritically traded around as commonplaces. In the remainder of the paper,
I want to consider the specific example from Longino [Lon90] [Lon02, pp. 126–
7, 183, 199–200]: the rôle of prenatal hormone levels in determining childhood
behavior. This case is not genuinely underdetermined, as we can see by considering an experiment that would decide the matter. In the final section, I argue
that underdetermination was not essential for Longino’s purposes anyway.

2

Hormones and gender-linked behavior

A news item heralding British research on the source of boyish behavior in
young girls announced, “Forget nurture, the tendency for a girl to behave like
a tomboy is all up to nature— specifically, the amount of testosterone a baby
is exposed to during pregnancy.” Quoted in the story, a researcher says, “Because hormones influence basic processes of brain development, they also exert
permanent influences on behaviour” [ABC02].2 This research and the uncritical reporting of it presuppose that chemicals effect behavior by effecting brains.
Differentiation of behavior between the sexes is taken to be the result of differing
brain chemistry, and this in turn is presumed to result from differing levels of
hormones. Whatever rôle environment plays in the differentiation of behavior is
(according to the model) independent of hormone levels and brain development.
1 Some authors have argued that inductive fallacies are responsible for prominent but degenerate debates in philosophy of science; cf. [MC04], [How00, p. 52–4], and [Lew01].
2 The study touted is Hines, et al. [HGR+ 02]. Claims about brains, which the researcher
makes to the media, are not made explicitly in the published study.

2

Prenatal
Hormone
Levels

Brain
Organization

Environment

Gender-linked
Behaviour
Figure 1: The LH model.
Longino calls this the Linear-Hormonal (LH) model. It posits a causal structure
like the one in figure 1.3
Two sorts of evidence are used in support of the LH model: animal and
human studies. In the animal studies, hormone levels are manipulated directly
and behavior is then observed. For example, testosterone correlates with fighting
behavior in rats. In human studies, groups with hormone disorders might be
observed and compared to control groups. For instance, girls with abnormally
high levels of prenatal androgens are observed to exhibit more boy-like behavior
than girls with normal levels.
Animals, Longino argues, are sufficiently unlike humans that the animal
studies should not be assumed to describe how the hormones being studied affect
3 This is Longino’s figure 2 [Lon90, p. 138]. The arrows should not be taken to imply immediate causation without intermediate causes, but only to imply that the elements represented
in the graph do not, according to the model, causally influence one another except where there
are arrows. The graphs I employ here can be understood as directed, acyclic graphs in the
manner of Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [SGS93]. Glymour uses the same methodology in
work lauded by Kourany [Gly98, cited above].
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human behavior.Even monkeys, who lack many of the complications present in
humans, have been shown to react differently to hormones than rats. [Lon90,
p. 157] I find Longino’s argument convincing, but that undercuts claims of
underdetermination and feminism. She argues that the animal evidence should
not be used to underwrite conclusions about humans, but she does so without
appealing in any obvious way to a rival conception of science. She does not
argue from the premise that she is a feminist to the conclusion that humans
are different than rats, but rather she argues against the analogy by pointing
to disanalogies. Would the disanalogies be unconvincing to anyone working
within the LH model? Wouldn’t LH partisans be unreasonable if they were
unconvinced?
The human studies, Longino believes, only stand as evidence for a particular
hormonal connection if one begins with the LH model. Longino suggests as an
alternative a selectionist model developed to explain human memory, learning,
and self-awareness. On this model, “experience. . . and self-image. . . play a primary role in the biological explanation of the behavior-action of species with a
highly developed cortex” [Lon90, p. 148].
Although this model “is not in use to explain any particular category of
behavior” [Lon90, p. 143], Longino suggests that it may provide an alternate
explanation for the results of the human studies. First, the girls with abnormally
high levels of prenatal androgens were aware that they had such a condition.
This medical history might make them feel self-conscious, feel unlike other girls,
and feel uncertain of their femininity. These factors could result in behavior seen
as more boy-like. Second, testosterone is known to affect muscle development.
More rambunctious behavior by the girls might simply have been an expression
of the consequent need for exercise. [Lon90, p. 150] Research employing the
LH model cannot be criticized as bad science, Longino thinks, because intrascientific considerations alone give no reason to prefer the selectionist model.
She writes:
Both rest on explanatory models that involve metaphysical assumptions about causality and human action. Neither theoretical perspective can muster constitutively based arguments sufficient to exclude
the other— thus both can continue to generate studies that are used
to support microhypotheses about the etiology of particular forms
of behavior that are consistent with one or the other broader model.
[Lon90, p. 161]
Rather than deciding based on strictly scientific concerns, Longino thinks we
should prefer the selectionist model because it accords with political ideals of autonomy and responsibility. Whereas the LH model connects behavior to a simple
biological variable, the selectionist model emphasizes “the enabling rather than
the limiting aspects of biology” [Lon90, p. 175-6].
Longino laments that “work on cognition shows no sign of reflection or analysis on the part of researchers. Correlation after correlation is produced with
no attempt to understand just what it is that is being measured or its relation
to associated phenomena” [Lon90, p. 167]. Indeed, she is right to insist that an
4

observed correlation alone does not establish any particular causal connection.
Nevertheless, a correlation is something to be explained— Longino admits as
much by providing a rival explanation.4 She accepts, just as adherents of the
LH model do, that the general causal structure is such that prenatal hormone
levels are at one end of a causal chain that has gender-linked behavior at the
other end. Longino offers only schematic and complicated depictions of the
selectionist model, but she offers specific causal hypotheses:
As for the. . . children who provide the strongest evidential base for
the hormonal model, one can say that their behavior is a specific response to their situation as they perceive it. They are. . . persons who
(1) have a medical history productive of greater self-consciousness
and self-knowledge than is usual for young people, (2) are quite
aware of their uniqueness, and (3) are very likely uncertain of their
“femininity” and possibly of their femaleness as well. This combination of circumstances may account for their choosing as children
behavior less restrictive in its implications for adult life than traditional girllike behavior is. Finally, such direct effects of testosterone
as do exist could be on muscle development, with a consequent need
for exercise. [Lon90, p. 150]
These are the specific hypotheses summarized above and in figure 2.
Longino makes much of the causal loops in the selectionist model. For instance, a child’s psychological state both effects and is effected by her actions.5
Yet there is no possibility of reciprocal causation between prenatal hormone
levels and gender-linked behavior, since the former plays its rôle years before
the latter occurs. If there is some causal connection, it must flow one way and
not the other. The correlation might result from some other causal structure—
e.g., if both were effects of a common cause— but, provided one is a causal ancestor of the other, it must be hormone levels causing childhood behavior and
not vice-versa. The only question is, What is the mechanism? Longino suggests that hormone levels effect the girls’ personal history in ways that, in turn,
effect their self image. The girls then make different choices than other girls.
Choices are causes of actions, of course, so this means that self image is taken
to be one causal factor controlling behavior. There is an additional causal pathway from hormones to behavior, one that goes through muscle development.
It is this causal scenario— and not the selectionist model tout court— that is
represented in figure 2.
Is Longino right to think that the choice between the causal account represented in figure 1 and the account represented in figure 2 is underdetermined
on the basis of evidence and that this determination could only be made on the
basis of contextual values? It is true that the mere correlation between hormone
levels and gender-linked behavior does not favor one over the other, but there are
4 Some correlations are spurious and need no special explanation, of course, but none of
the parties suggest that here.
5 Cf. her figures 6 and 7. [Lon90, pp. 147, 149]
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Figure 2: Longino’s selectionist model.
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testable differences nonetheless. Notice that on the selectionist account (figure
2), hormones only influence behavior through intermediate causes of personal
history and muscle development. Two children with identical histories and muscle development should thus exhibit the same degree of gender-linked behavior
regardless of their prenatal hormone levels. Contrast this with the LH model
(figure 1), in which there is a causal path from hormones to behavior which
goes only through brain organization, such that gender-linked behavior should
be strongly correlated with hormone levels even among children in identical
environments with identical muscle development.
Imagine an experiment, then, in which one each out of pairs of identical twins
is treated with hormones in utero. The twins are never told which was which.
They are not even told that they are part of a medical study. As they grow
up, careful records are kept of their muscle development, using some objective
measure like muscle mass. When they reach school age, case workers judge
whether the childrens’ behavior is boyish or girlish.
The question here would not be simply whether or not prenatal hormone
levels correlate with behavior, but whether they do so conditional upon history
and muscle development. If a correlation remains conditional on these other
factors, then it could not be explained by a causal structure like figure 2; some
other causal path would have to exist between hormone levels and behavior.
Conversely, if no significant correlation remains after conditioning on history
and muscle development, then a causal structure like figure 1 could be ruled
out. Neither result would prove what the causal structure actually is in an
absolute sense, but either would eliminate one of the two rivals. Controlling
directly for personal history and conditioning on muscle development would
eliminate the correlation between those variables and prenatal hormone levels.
If a correlation remains between prenatal hormone levels, then there must be
some other causal path between the two. Some variable X may intervene—
perhaps brain organization.
There may be concerns about this experimental design. There are familiar
worries about twin studies, for instance that there are never enough natural
twins and that there are sample selection biases. So imagine a more extreme
version of the experiment in which twins are forcibly harvested and raised in
a clinical facility to fully control for history. Some variation on this doubleblind structure should yield robust results. The alleged underdetermination
yields no significant conclusion, since further evidence can close the inferential
gap. This is just the ordinary situation of enquiry. Cost might make such a
study impractical, but more importantly moral considerations would make it
reprehensible. What this shows, though, is that there are things we are not
willing to do in the name of science. Empirical considerations could decide
between the two theories, if we were willing to pay the price for the knowledge.6
Of course, these empirical considerations do not settle the matter deductively. There are still assumptions that, as Longino says, “establish the evi6 It’s not clear that such an extreme study is necessary. The study mentioned above
[HGR+ 02] involved healthy children rather than children with hormone disorders. One of
the factors that Longino appeals to (peculiar medical history) is absent.
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dential relevance of data to hypotheses” [Lon02, p. 126]. Yet the assumptions
are not morally charged assumptions about humanity and agency. It is unclear
how the assumptions involved in a suitably designed experiment would have a
controversial sociopragmatic dimension.
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Postscript

Longino argues that we should pursue research programmes within the selectionist model and abandon present work within the LH model. I am sympathetic
with this position, but I don’t see how it requires the choice between the models
to be underdetermined. Let me suggest a way we might reach her conclusion,
but without relying on claims of underdetermination.
The experiment proposed in the previous section presumes that only one of
the two models is true. Even if we suppose that hormones have some influence
on brain development, it is certain that such influence is not the only thing going
on— otherwise the correlations would be perfect. So it seems that environment
is also playing a rôle. Suppose that the LH model and the selectionist model
both told part of the causal story. Prenatal hormones would influence behavior
in a number of ways: by the mechanisms posited in the LH model, by those
posited in the selectionist model, and perhaps by other ways as well. If that
were so, the choice would not be underdetermined, because there would not
need to be any choice at all. We would be justified in accepting elements of
both models.7
Yet this would not settle Longino’s question: How should we structure research programmes that study the effects of hormones? As Longino notes,
scientific research is selective. It explores some features of the world and not
others. As such, we should pick programmes not only on the basis of whether
their posits conform to the world but also on the basis of whether or not they
explore features of the world that we care about.
Longino gives us good reason to think that the features picked out by the
LH model aren’t ones we should care about, even if those features do represent
part of the whole causal story. As such, our concerns should lead us to prefer
the selectionist model.
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